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1. Introduction 
  
 It has long been accepted that access to capital is an important determinant of rates of 
investment. While an empirical literature has begun to emerge that investigates issues 
surrounding liquidity constraints in firms’ investment decisions, our main motivation for the 
paper is that the dominant strategies used in the empirical investment literature suffer from 
several shortcomings. By using new panel data for Estonian firms during the period 1993 to 
1999, we respond to some of these deficiencies. More specifically, we employ improved 
sample splitting criteria for separating firms into financially constrained and unconstrained. In 
addition we ensure that the implementation of these improved sample splitting criteria are 
integrated with appropriate theoretical modeling of investment, as well as the adoption of 
pertinent empirical strategies. We test whether or not separate regimes exist for firms that are 
financially constrained or unconstrained and we also compare the investment-cash flow 
sensitivities for firms in these regimes. The use of panel data allows us to tackle problems 
such as selectivity and aggregation bias, and measurement error.  
This paper is of particular interest in that we provide evidence on the impact of the 
severity of information asymmetries and agency costs and the existence of soft budget 
constraints on the likelihood of firms’ being financially constrained. Moreover, by calculating 
probabilities of firms’ operating in the financially constrained regime we are able to provide 
evidence of the pervasiveness of financial constraints across groups of firms and their 
persistence over time in an advanced transition economy such as Estonia. Furthermore, we 
provide evidence on differences in propensity to invest by ownership structure as well as 
broad support to the hypothesis whether firms in transition economies behave similarly to 
those in advanced market economies.    
  The point of departure for standard empirical approaches is the recognition both of 
the importance of liquidity constraints in firms’ investment decisions and also that the effect 
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of liquidity constraints is not evenly distributed across firms with some firms facing higher 
costs when raising capital than do others. These arguments lead to a financing hierarchy or 
pecking order hypothesis, whereby, when undertaking investments, financially constrained 
firms first prefer internal financing to more expensive external financing and then, if external 
financing is needed, prefer low-risk debt financing to new equity issues. In testing these 
hypotheses empirical research usually follows a strategy in which, initially, a standard 
investment demand model (e.g., accelerator or neoclassical or Tobin’s Q) is augmented with 
financial variables to proxy for the degree of financial constraints. Alternatively, structural 
investment equations are derived from optimization of the firm’s objective function under 
debt and equity constraints, and the sample is divided, a priori, into financially constrained 
and unconstrained firms using alternative classification criteria. Finally, separate equations 
are estimated for each group of firms. Support for the financing hierarchy hypothesis is 
provided if financial variables present in investment equations are found to be significant for 
financially constrained firms, but insignificant for financially unconstrained firms.  
Yet this empirical strategy has its problems1. In this paper we address the biases that 
arise in testing for the presence of financial constraints, independently of how investment 
decisions are modeled, when the sample splitting criteria that are used may be inappropriate. 
In most of the empirical literature a single quantitative or qualitative indicator, such as 
dividend payout ratios, bond rating, degree of bank affiliation, firm size, firm age, or 
ownership structure, is used to partition firms into those that are or are not potentially 
financially constrained2. The implication of these approaches is that the estimation results 
would be highly sensitive to the criteria and threshold values chosen. The conflicting findings 
in the existing literature, reviewed for example in Schianterelli (1996), provide ample support 
for this implication. 
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 Another and perhaps a more important consideration is that, independently of the 
number of indicators used in partitioning the sample or in choosing the threshold values, a 
firm is exogenously classified as financially constrained or not. In addition, firms are kept in 
that regime over the whole sample period. In general, the partition indicator will be correlated 
with the dependent variable, which causes endogenous selection problems. The ad hoc 
selection of partition criteria is, therefore, likely to cause what might be called static 
misclassification. Furthermore, as financial constraints change, over time firms might move 
from one regime to the other. Thus even if the classification method avoids problems of static 
misclassification, over time the issue of what might be called dynamic misclassification 
arises. This issue becomes more important as the time period under consideration lengthens. 
In the paper, both the static and dynamic misclassification problems are tackled by 
introducing a switching regression approach with endogenous and unknown sample 
separation. 
In the next section we discuss our data and the definitions of variables employed in the 
analysis. This is followed by an account of the estimating approach and the specifications we 
use in the empirical analysis. In the fourth section, estimation results are reported and 
discussed. While in the last part we conclude and discuss some implications of our findings.  
2. Sample Description and Variable Definitions 
The degree and pervasiveness of liquidity constraints depend on the stage of 
development of the financial system. Estonia needed not only to liberalize its existing 
centralized financial system, but also to build new institutions and develop the regulatory and 
supervisory framework. Financial liberalization, which happened early on in transition, 
included the abolishment of subsidies and direct credits, as well as of controls on interest rates 
and on capital movements. Institution building started with the establishment of Estonian 
Central Bank in 19903 and the adoption of a two-tier banking system. The EBRD (1994) 
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reports that this led to the creation, between 1989 and 1992, of 42 commercial banks, mostly 
small, undercapitalized and owned by large enterprises. A serious banking crisis during 1992-
1993 caused industry consolidation and market concentration through a wave of mergers and 
liquidations. By 1997, the share of bank assets owned by the state had fallen to zero, as 
documented in Table 14.  
A further feature of the Estonian banking sector is increased foreign presence, both the 
proportion of the total number of banks that are foreign owned and the share of total bank 
assets owned by foreigners, which rose from 15% in 1994 to 61% in 1998 (Mygind, 2000). In 
addition to consolidation, the banking crisis also led to increased regulation and tighter 
supervision in order to improve the efficiency of the banking system. Overall, Estonia scores 
quite high in the index of banking system reforms, with only Hungary scoring higher. Yet, as 
Berglof and Bolton (2002) argue, often banks in transition economies are more involved in 
financing the government rather than the private system. However, because of the currency 
board introduced in 1992 and the balanced state budget Estonia is not an exception in this 
respect, although the share of credit to the private sector5 has steadily increased over time 
reaching almost 26% of GDP in 2000. In sum, the banking system in Estonia is consolidated, 
well regulated, increasingly foreign-owned, increasingly active in financing private activity, 
and relatively efficient, as expressed by the percentage of bad loans to total loans. 
 Another potential source of both debt and equity capital for the private sector is the 
capital market. However, it was not until the end of 1994 that shares started to be traded over-
the-counter at a computerized depository.  The Tallin Stock Exchange (TSE) did not start 
operating until May 1996, using a continuous trading, market-making system. The initial 
market capitalization was 16.7% of GDP. By 2000, only 23 companies were listed on the TSE 
with total market capitalization amounting to 35% of GDP6. The stock market7, however, is 
small and not sectorally diversified. Attempts have also been made to integrate the Estonian 
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market with other capital markets in the region by building exchange alliances. In January 
2000, the stock exchanges for all three Baltic Republics started trading a pan-Baltic list of 
shares that included 5 Estonian firms. 
In summary, the development of the financial system infrastructure in Estonia made it 
increasingly possible for companies to gain access to capital through bank loans, while the 
stock market played only a marginal role as a source of capital. However, as enterprises 
engaged in deeper post-privatization restructuring, higher demand for funds, accompanied by 
limited bank involvement in financing the private sector, resulted in heavier reliance on 
internal finance and severe credit rationing for specific groups of firms8.       
This conjecture is tested using annual firm-level observations of a sample of Estonian 
firms over the period 1993 through 1999. The sample is created through a combination of data 
obtained from surveys and from standard firm financial statements reported to the Estonian 
Statistical Office. The surveys gather information on ownership configurations, which is not 
available in standard financial statements. The firms included in the survey scheme are 
selected as a stratified random sample based on size and industry. However, before merging 
this information to create an unbalanced panel data set for the data analysis, we recognize 
that, potentially, there are issues of measurement error in financial data during early transition 
that other researchers have noted  (e.g. Filer and Hanousek, 2002).  To address these issues, 
we use several criteria to examine our data.9 The application of all these criteria results in our 
using in the data analysis a data set consisting of 3294 observations over the whole period 
1993 through 1999.10 The detailed list of variables and their definitions are given in Table 2.  
Sample firms are classified into six ownership groups according to the dominant 
owner: domestic outsider, employee, former employee, foreign, manager and state. The data11 
show that insider ownership, i.e., employee and manager, emerged as an important form of 
privatization. For example, in 1995 in more than 22% of cases, insiders or former insiders are 
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dominant owners. Foreign owned companies comprise around 12% of the sample, with most 
of them being new companies established in the early 1990s, while domestic outsider owned 
firms comprise around 18% of cases. Finally, state owned firms account for around 48% of 
the sample, with 232 firms being 100% state owned while 30 firms are mostly in private 
hands but with the state still holding a dominant position12. Inspecting the size distribution of 
firms reveals that state owned firms are mostly large. By contrast, insider owned (i.e., 
employee, former employee and manager owned) and, surprisingly, foreign owned firms tend 
to be of small and medium size. Domestic outsider owned firms are both small and large.  
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics of the most relevant variables used in the 
analysis for the whole (unbalanced) panel, while Table 3.2 presents summary statistics for the 
balanced panel13. One observation emerging from both of these tables is that investment 
levels are high relative to capital stock, with investment/capital ratio ranging from 0.17 in 
1993 to 0.34 in 1995 for the unbalanced panels and from 0.17 in 1993 to 0.36 in 1995 for the 
balanced panel. We also see that average employment decreases while real wage increases 
over time, that cash flow is positive, that short-term debt increases over time and that cash 
flow and short-term debt are approximately the same magnitude in most years. The increase 
in debt after 1995 is consistent with the general increase of lending to the private sector 
during this period as reported in Table 1. This serves as an indication that Estonian firms 
enjoy access to capital and might not be as liquidity constrained as one could expect at this 
early stage of transition. Furthermore, up to 1997, the sum of cash flow and short-term debt is 
less than investment suggesting that firms might have had access to other sources of capital 
such as short-term trade credit and/or long-term debt. This conjecture is supported by the last 
two rows of the table that show current payables and long-term liabilities, which include long-
term loans as well as any other long-term debt a firm accumulates. The rate of growth of long-
term liabilities is not high, except for the last year in the unbalanced panel, suggesting that 
 7
long-term liabilities do not constitute an important source of capital over the stated period. 
Current payables, however, are quite high and higher than investment over the whole period, 
suggesting that they have been an important source of financing especially during the early 
years of the transition. Another important feature of Estonian firms during this period is that, 
on average, they have become more capital intensive as demonstrated by the increase in 
capital and the decrease in employment. 
Finally, to ascertain the importance of internal versus external financing in investment 
in fixed capital, we focus on the share of investment financed through internal funds or short 
or long-term debt. Information on the sources of financing investment is available for a small 
sub-sample of firms.14  Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the evolution of the share of investment 
financed through internal funds and loans by ownership group.15 It is apparent that, for all 
ownership groups, a very high share of investment is financed through internal funds. In 
several cases, notably for employee owned, former employee owned and state owned firms, in 
some years this share is as high as 100%. In no case is this share below 60%, which is in 
sharp contrast with the findings of Estrin and Jones (1998) who find that employee owned 
firms in their French sample fund up to 47% of their investment externally. Foreign owned 
firms receive most outside financing16, with the highest share reaching 37% in 1994, followed 
by domestic outsider owned firms. This reliance on internal financing might result from 
owners’ reluctance to use external financing due to fear of loss of control or it might reflect an 
inability to borrow externally17.  
The data used in this study often possess certain advantages compared to data used by 
most other researchers, especially those working on transition. First, our surveys allow us to 
define a broader range of ownership groups than are usually found in transition studies where, 
if ownership data are available, classifications are usually restricted to state, foreign and 
domestic private firms. When authors are able to identify insider owners, they can seldom 
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distinguish between employees, managers or former insiders. Second, the use of different 
waves of ownership data allows us to capture dynamics that are not possible to capture when 
shorter data series are used18. Finally, the combination of ownership with economic and 
financial data allows us to better measure the effect of unobserved firm characteristics, such 
as, for instance, the existence and degree of soft budget constraints, on firm behavior. These 
features of our data may make our findings of interest to both researchers on transition as 
well, more generally, to students of corporate governance. 
3. The Estimating Framework 
A switching regression model19 is based on the existence of a switching function that 
determines whether a firm operates in one of several potential regimes. The appropriateness 
of using this model is determined by the model’s ability to identify significant differences in 
the data at hand that allow efficient clustering of firms into groups. A further advantage of the 
model is that it allows for the simultaneous determination of differences in investment 
behavior across firms and the likelihood of their belonging to a particular regime over time.   
At any time, a firm is assumed to operate either in the financially unconstrained (FU) 
or in the financially constrained (FC) regime. While the number of regimes is known, the 
particular regime a firm operates in is determined by the switching function, which depends 
on those variables that theoretically determine the wedge between internal and external 
finance, severity of information and agency problems and time-varying firm characteristics. 
Assume that for every firm, operating in one of the financial regimes mentioned above, at any 
time, investment equations are given by the following expressions: 
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In the above equations i  denotes firms,  denotes time,  and  are vectors of 
explanatory variables that might possibly overlap, 
t tiX , tiZ ,
1β , 2β  and α  are vectors of parameters to 
be estimated, while ti,1ε , ti ,2ε  and ti,ε  are respective error terms that are supposed to be 
correlated across equations, but not over time. Equations (1) and (3) are the structural 
investment equations, while equations (2) and (4) constitute the switching function that, 
together with the investment equations, will be estimated simultaneously.  
A further assumption that needs to be made to close the model is whether the sample 
separation is known or not, i.e., whether the observed values of investment are known 
beforehand to come from the process given by equation (1) or from the process given by 
equation (3). Here it is assumed that this is not known and the model specified then becomes 
an endogenous switching regression model with sample separation unknown20. The 
parameters of the investment equations and the switching function are then estimated by 
maximum likelihood techniques.21  Once the equations are estimated, the respective 
probabilities of the firm being in either regime are calculated.  
In estimating the above model, functional forms for both the investment and switching 
equations need to be specified. Here we assume that the investment equation corresponds to 
the one derived from neoclassical/accelerator models of investment demand as, for example, 
in Koyck (1954) and Jorgenson (1963). Although these models are derived under restrictive 
assumptions, they perform well empirically and are among the most widely used in both the 
western and transition literature22. In its basic form the neoclassical/accelerator model is 
derived under the assumption that the supply of investment funds is perfectly elastic and, 
consequently does not allow financial constraints to affect investment. Usually, in the 
 10
literature, profit or cash flow variables are included in empirical specifications to account for 
the possibility of imperfect substitutability of internal and external finance. However, it is not 
clear whether the coefficients of these variables reflect more imperfect substitutability of 
internal and external finance, information on future profitability of the firm or the presence of 
Jensen’s (1986) “free cash flow”. One way to partially overcome this problem is to introduce 
interaction terms between cash flow and variables designed to measure the severity of agency 
costs. The difference in estimates of the coefficients of these variables will then be interpreted 
as differences in access to external finance. Alternatively, under the assumption that a non-
zero cash flow coefficient for unconstrained firms captures future profitability, the difference 
in size between cash flow coefficients of constrained and unconstrained firms can be 
interpreted as capturing the reliance on internal finance. Following this discussion, the 
investment equation to be estimated is: 
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where , Y and  denote investment, capital, output (sales) and cash flow respectively, 
stands for the number of lags to be included,  is a vector of industry and time dummies 
that capture effects common to all firms, while 
KI , CF
s D
M  is the inverse Mill's ratio or the probability 
that the firm is included in the sample. The latter is included because, for some of the firms 
during some years data are missing. By estimating a Heckman-type probit model, we 
calculate the probability that the firm is included in the sample, on the basis of investment, 
profit, industry affiliation and firm type.  
The estimated investment equation includes cash flow as well as two measures of 
financial slack. One measure is defined as the sum of cash, short-term receivables and short-
term securities; the other measure is the revenue obtained from the sale of non-current 
tangible assets. Unlike cash flow, these variables measure only the availability of internal 
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funds and, consequently, will provide further evidence of the existence of credit rationing. 
The assumption here is that measures of financial slack are not likely to be positively 
correlated with a firm’s future opportunities. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argue that high 
levels of financial slack are associated with a lack of financial constraints, given that 
investment will not be conditioned by the availability of finance. On the other hand, Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen (1996) and Kim, Mauer and Sherman (1998) argue that high levels of 
financial slack might be associated with financial constraints given that it is those firms that 
expect to be constrained that accumulate large holdings of liquidity. These arguments mean 
that, for financially constrained firms, the coefficients for financial slack variables are 
expected to be positive and statistically significant, pointing to the inability of these firms to 
substitute between internal and external finance, while for financially unconstrained firms the 
coefficients for financial slack variables are not expected to be different from zero, indicating 
that they can freely switch between internal and external financing. 
The literature stresses two motivations for firms to undertake voluntary asset sales. 
The first is that asset sales allow the firm to restructure operations and achieve greater 
productive efficiency by offloading unproductive assets (Hite, Owers and Rogers,1987; John 
and Offek,1995). In this case asset sales are not correlated with future investment 
opportunities and are expected to provide relief to financially constrained firms. On the other 
hand, the assumption of no correlation of measures of financial slack and future investment 
opportunities will be violated when a voluntary asset sale is determined by the likelihood of 
future constraints, rather than by restructuring considerations. Lang, Poulsen and Stulz (1995) 
argue that firms that sell assets are poor performers and/or that they have high leverage. This 
view suggests that asset sales provide funds when alternative sources of finance are too 
expensive. In this case the causality between asset sales and investment outlays is reversed, 
but is still expected to be positive and significant for financially constrained firms. 
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Finally, ownership dummies are included in investment equations to capture 
differences in investment behavior across firms of different ownership structures that have 
nothing to do with financial constraints. For example, employee owned firms might be 
expected to under-invest due to employee owners’ risk attitudes, goal structure or the 
designation of property rights (Dow, 2003).  
The switching function, given by equations (2) and (4), it is assumed to be a function 
of two sets of variables: those that determine the firm's financial status and those that measure 
the degree of information and agency problems. The former set of variables includes balance 
sheet and income statement items, such as debt to capital ratio, interest payments to sales ratio 
and liquid financial assets to capital ratio. The latter set of variables includes the percentage of 
shares owned by the largest owner, as a measure of ownership concentration, firm's age and 
firm size. Time and industry dummies complete the set of explanatory variables of the 
switching function. The straightforward interpretation of the coefficients of these dummies is 
that they represent the effects of general macroeconomic conditions23 on the probability of a 
firm being financially constrained. As these conditions are the same for all the firms in the 
economy or in an industry, their sum constitutes the threshold over which a firm will be 
classified as financially constrained based on its own characteristics. Given that being 
financially constrained at any time will depend on past performance and results, all variables 
in the switching function other than time and industry dummies enter in the first lag.  
This specification of the switching equation would lead to very different sample 
partition into constrained and unconstrained firms than when sample separation is based on 
threshold values chosen by us subjectively. Examples of the latter approach would be the use 
of ownership structures in dividing the sample into insider owned versus outsider owned 
firms, with state owned firms included in the latter group due to soft budget constraints 
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considerations, or the use of debt-to-capital and/or liquidity-to-capital ratios to partition the 
sample.  
Firms having a high debt to capital ratio are expected to be suffering either from a lack 
of collateralizable assets or from exhaustion of existing collateralizable assets and are, 
therefore, highly likely to be operating in the financially constrained regime. Similarly, firms 
having a high interest payment to sales ratio, i.e. a heavy burden in servicing the existing debt, 
are more likely to operate in the financially constrained regime. On the other hand, firms 
having a high ratio of liquid assets to capital have plenty of resources at their disposal and, 
consequently, would face a low probability of being financially constrained. This means that, 
in the switching function specification, the coefficients on the ratios of debt to capital and 
interest payment to sales are expected to be positive, while the coefficient on liquid assets/ 
capital is expected to be negative.  
However, if firms enjoy easy access to capital or experience soft budget constraints24, 
then the effect of financial variables on the probability of being financially constrained either 
would be insignificant or significantly reduced. The notion of soft budget constraints includes 
cheap capital provided to firms in the form of direct government subsidies and tax arrears25, 
trade credits, and cheap loans from the banking sector. The strict budgetary and competition 
promoting policies adopted by successive Estonian governments have reduced the level of 
subsidies provided by direct budgetary policies to minimal levels. Thus, EBRD (2000) reports 
that, during 1995 through 2000, budgetary subsidies in Estonia were less than 1% of GDP, 
except for 1995 when they amounted to 1.9% of GDP. As such, direct budgetary subsidies do 
not constitute an important source of finance for Estonian firms. Tax arrears though might 
provide a significant means through which the state extends its support to distressed firms. 
Detailed data on tax arrears are, unfortunately, unavailable from standard financial statements. 
There is, however, some information that corroborates the existence and pervasiveness of tax 
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arrears in Estonia. For example, EBRD (2000) stresses that the efficiency of the collection of 
social security tax at the enterprise level in Estonia was 85.6% in 1998 and 76.2% in 1999. 
Furthermore, EBRD (1999) presents the results of a firm-level survey carried out in several 
transition countries. Among other things, firms were asked about their level of tax arrears. 
The results show that, although among advanced transition economies Estonia is the country 
with the lowest percentage of firms reporting tax arrears, this problem is found in about 9% of 
firms. 
Another potential source of cheap capital is overdue trade credit to suppliers. As in the 
case of tax arrears, it is not possible to gauge the importance of trade credit from financial 
statement data. In the previous section it was shown that current payables are high and 
increasing over time across all categories of firms. These, however, might not reflect overdue 
payments but rather contractual arrangements or delivery lags. In fact, it is highly possible 
that most current payables do not constitute overdue trade credit. Furthermore, if high levels 
of overdue trade credit are rolled over into long-term liabilities, this will translate into a high 
growth rate for long-term liabilities. But as seen from the previous section, this growth rate is 
low for almost all the period. Schaffer (1998) argues that, at least in more advanced transition 
economies, firms have learnt to apply hard budget constraints to each other26.  
A final alternative measure of soft budget constraints is easy access on the part of 
distressed or loss-making firms to bank lending through special relations with banks and/or 
other financial institutions. To properly establish the extent of this channel of soft budget 
constraints one needs to combine data from both firms and banks. It is tempting to interpret 
positive net financing from a loss-making firm as evidence of soft budget constraints. 
However, this would be the case only if the stated loan has a low economic value to the bank 
itself.  Unfortunately, data on whether banks invest in low economic value projects are not 
available, as banks are reluctant to disclose such information. Two conjectures, however, may 
 15
be drawn from the data in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, i.e. the share of investment financed through 
loans over time. First, if firms in Estonia had widespread easy access to bank loans we would 
expect the share of investment financed through bank loans to be higher. Second, if certain 
firms enjoyed special relations with banks we would expect the share of investment financed 
through bank loans to be either stable or increasing over time. However, from Table 4.2 it is 
clear that only state owned firms have a share that is more or less stable over time, although 
the share is small. These facts indicate that, although access to cheap credit might be present 
in Estonia, it is neither widespread not persistent over time. 
Overall, the presence of soft budget constraints would mitigate the severity of 
financial constraints and, if not accounted for, would provide biased estimates of financial 
variables that are constructed to measure the probability of a firm being financially 
constrained. Among the potential channels for soft budget constraints to operate, in Estonia 
the data clearly show that direct budgetary subsidies are unimportant. Assessing the relative 
importance of the other three channels is a difficult task, due to the lack of appropriate data, as 
with tax arrears, or data that is too noisy, as with attempts to isolate trade credit and easy bank 
loans. Nevertheless, given the theoretical importance of soft budget constraints, we use the 
available data to construct a dummy variable measure. This takes the value 1 if, at a given 
time, a firm has negative earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation (EBITD) and, at the 
same time, receives positive net financing, defined as an increase in short-term debt net of 
financing costs.27  
With respect to the second set of variables that enter the switching equation, the 
percentage of shares owned by the largest owner is used as a proxy for the severity of agency 
problems, while the firm's age and size are used to proxy the severity of informational 
asymmetries. The expected sign on the coefficient of the percentage of shares owned by the 
largest owner is theoretically ambiguous. If it mitigates agency problems, a more concentrated 
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ownership is expected to lead to a lower probability of a firm being financially constrained. 
However, if shares are concentrated in the hands of managers and/or employees, insider-
outsider conflicts of interests will arise, and this might lead to a higher probability of being 
financially constrained. A way to test these conflicting hypotheses is to include interaction 
terms of the percentage of shares owned by the largest owner with respective ownership 
dummies. The coefficients of these terms are expected to be negative when ownership is 
concentrated in the hands of outside owners, while they are expected to be positive when 
ownership is concentrated in the hands of insiders. Furthermore, young firms are expected to 
be more prone to informational asymmetries than established firms, which have better 
possibilities of creating long-term relationships with providers of capital than do newly 
established privatized firms. Consequently, the sign of the coefficient on a firm's age is 
expected to be negative. Finally, small firms could face a higher premium on external finance 
due to the higher cost of collecting information on them. In addition, small firms incur higher 
transaction costs when issuing both debt and equity financing and will face a higher risk of 
bankruptcy than will large firms. This means that the coefficient of firm's size is also expected 
to be negative. 
The power of this approach stands in tackling the static and dynamic misclassification 
biases arising in sample separation. The discussion above has highlighted how we have 
accounted for the static bias. In addition, this approach is justified on the grounds that firms 
frequently change regimes over time. For instance, in our sample 30% of firms change 
regimes at least once during the period under consideration, with 18% changing regimes twice 
and 9% changing regimes three or more times. These data underscore the seriousness of the 
dynamic misclassification bias and point to the appropriatness of our approach. 
4. Empirical Results and Findings 
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In this section we report the estimates of investment equations28 and switching 
function29 parameters. Due to the long time period under consideration we observe entry of 
new firms and exit of existing firms from the sample.  These decisions are potentially not 
random and we expect our findings to be sensitive to this phenomenon. As such, we report 
estimates using both balanced and unbalanced panels30, which provides evidence of the 
robustness of results, as well as of the direction and magnitude of the bias caused by entry and 
exit of firms over time.  
In part 1 of Tables 5 and 6 we report the results of estimating investment equations for 
firms operating in each regime. Except for the time and industry dummies, all other variables 
in the switching equation are included as first lags. Table 5 presents estimates when the whole 
(unbalanced) sample is used, while Table 6 presents estimates when only the balanced sub-
sample is used. As seen from both tables the coefficient estimates of output (sales) and 
measures of internal funds across both regimes are mostly statistically significant and of the 
expected sign, indicating strong support for the neoclassical/accelerator model. These results 
are in line with those obtained from other studies in both advanced market economies and 
transition economies, which have used neoclassical/accelerator models of investment 
behavior and found output and internal funds to be a significant determinant of investment. 
For example, Lizal and Svejnar (1998) find the sum of coefficients on output to be 0.027 and 
the sum of coefficients on profit to be 0.019, while Lizal and Svejnar (2002) find those 
coefficients to be 0.010 and 0.019, respectively31. In a study of firms from the three Baltic 
Republics, Lesnik and Sterken (1998) find that the coefficient on output to be at the range 
0.007 to 0.04, while the coefficient on cash flow to be at the range 0.135 to 0.175. These 
results, however, corresponds to estimates with pooled samples and as such are not directly 
comparable with our estimates. In a similar study to ours, Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) find the 
coefficients of sales and cash flow for firms in high-premium (constrained) regime to be 0.001 
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and 0.192, while for those in low-premium (unconstrained) regime to be 0.035 and 0.053 
respectively.       
Turning to differences in investment behavior across the two regimes, from Table 5 
we see that the coefficients of lagged cash flow variables are statistically significant at either 
the 5% or 1% levels. Furthermore, as expected, the lagged cash flow coefficient is larger for 
financially constrained firms than for financially non-constrained firms, i.e., 0.013 versus 
0.007. This supports the hypothesis that financially constrained firms are more sensitive to the 
availability of internal finance than are financially unconstrained firms. The positive and 
significant coefficient of lagged cash flow for financially unconstrained firms provides 
evidence that this variable conveys some information on future profitability. Then, the 
difference of this coefficient between constrained for unconstrained firms is attributed to 
different sensitivities to the availability of internal funds.  
The coefficient of twice lagged cash flow is positive and statistically significant only 
for firms operating in the financially constrained regime. This might be interpreted as 
evidence consistent with a cash smoothing or “buffer stock” liquidity hypothesis, i.e., given 
an inability to secure all desired financing when a profitable investment project is undertaken, 
financially constrained firms accumulate internal funds over time and use them to finance 
these projects. Further evidence of different sensitivities to the availability of internal funds 
across firms operating in the two regimes is given by the coefficients of variables measuring 
financial slack, i.e., liquid assets and asset sales. The coefficients of lagged liquid assets and 
its twice lagged value are positive and significant for firms operating in both regimes, with 
those operating in the constrained regime displaying a higher sensitivity to the availability of 
liquid assets. This finding implies that all firms accumulate large holdings of liquidity to 
substitute for their inability to obtain external finance. However, the coefficients of the asset 
sales variables are statistically significant only for financially constrained firms, implying that 
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asset sales provide additional funds for investment. In contrast, the coefficients for financially 
unconstrained firms are positive but statistically insignificant. Finally, support for the 
hypothesis of different investment behavior across groups is provided by the coefficient 
estimates of sales and its lagged value. All coefficients are positive and statistically significant 
at a 1% level, but they are larger in absolute value for unconstrained firms than for 
constrained firms. This is consistent with the hypothesis that unconstrained firms are able to 
react more to the prospect of future growth opportunities, summarized by the sales variable, 
than are firms operating in the constrained regime.     
Finally, the signs and significance of ownership dummies reveal notable differences 
across the two regimes. The coefficients should be interpreted as the differential effect of a 
particular ownership structure on investment over the control group of state ownership. 
Surprisingly, ownership structure does not seem to matter when firms operate in the 
financially unconstrained regime. On the contrary, ownership structure leads to differences in 
investment behavior only for firms that operate in the financially constrained regime. More 
specifically, investment in constrained firms increases with foreign ownership and decreases 
with employee and managerial ownership. In the latter case this phenomenon might reflect the 
preferences and goals of insider owners, who might prefer to divert resources in higher 
individual income rather than invest in the firm. Although, in principle, insiders, and 
especially non-managerial employees, own the shares individually there is empirical 
evidence32 to show that there exist a strong degree of collective ownership. This fact makes 
our findings in line with those of Estrin and Jones (1998), who find that investment in 
employee owned firms decreases with the share of capital, which is collectively owned. 
Turning to the results obtained from the balanced panel (reported in Table 6), we see 
that the signs and statistical significance of coefficients are essentially the same as those 
obtained from the unbalanced panel, implying that results are robust and not affected by entry 
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and exit of firms over time. The coefficient of the lagged cash flow variable is again larger for 
financially constrained firms (0.018 versus 0.003). Financially constrained firms are also 
found to have positive and statistically significant coefficients on financial slack variables. 
However, in terms of coefficient magnitudes there are differences between findings for the 
balanced and unbalanced panels. Most of the coefficients obtained from the balanced panel 
are larger in absolute value than those obtained from the unbalanced panel. Thus it is tempting 
to conclude that entry and exit of firms over time causes a downward bias in coefficient 
estimates. In terms of the estimated coefficients for the ownership dummies, findings are 
essentially unchanged.  
The existence of two distinct investment regimes can be tested using appropriate 
likelihood ratio tests. However, under the restriction that the coefficients of the two 
investment equations are equal, the parameters of the switching equation are not identified, 
which makes it difficult to calculate degrees of freedom. In addition, the likelihood ratio test 
statistic might not be asymptotically distributed as distribution. Yet, Goldfeld and Quandt 
(1976) have suggested that the likelihood ratio test can be performed using a distribution 
with degrees of freedom equal to the sum of the number of constraints and the number of 
unidentified parameters. In the above models the number of degrees of freedom is 45 when 
the balanced panel is used and 46 when the unbalanced panel is used, with the difference 
reflecting the inclusion of the inverse Mill’s ratio in the investment specification when the 
unbalanced panel is used.  When the likelihood ratio tests are performed, for both panels the 
null hypothesis of a single regime is decisively rejected.
2χ
2χ
33    
Next we test for the equality of individual coefficients in investment equations across 
the two regimes. More specifically, we test whether the coefficient of lagged cash flow is 
equal for firms operating in the financially constrained regime and those operating in the 
financially unconstrained regime. The t-statistic for the unbalanced panel is 7.47, while for the 
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balanced panel is 10.13, leading in both cases to decisive rejection of the null hypothesis. In 
the case of the coefficient of lagged sales, the respective t-statistics are 5.07 for the 
unbalanced panel and 9.78 for the balanced panel, again leading to rejection, at high levels of 
statistical significance, of the null hypothesis. Similar tests are performed for the other 
variables in the investment equations and in all cases we are able to reject the null of 
coefficients equality. 
Turning to estimates of the switching equations, an important general conclusion that 
emerges is that both balance sheet, and information asymmetry and agency cost variables are 
important determinants of the likelihood of whether the firm is financially constrained or not. 
In both Tables 5 and 6 the coefficients of debt to capital and interest payment to sales ratios 
are positive, although not always significant, indicating that, as expected, higher values of 
these ratios make a firm more likely to operate in the financially constrained regime. 
Furthermore, the coefficient of liquidity to capital ratio is negative and significant at 1% 
significance level, indicating that the higher the ratio the lower the likelihood the firm will 
operate in the financially constrained regime.   
The coefficients of the variable that interacts the percentage of shares owned by the 
largest owner with the appropriate measure of ownership are mostly significant, indicating 
that ownership concentration is important in determining the regime in which a firm operates. 
The signs of the coefficients, however, are essentially similar across panels, except for the 
coefficient of the shares owned by managers. For instance, in the unbalanced panel estimates, 
the coefficients of the percentage of shares owned by the state and employees are positive and 
statistically significant, suggesting that higher ownership concentration in the hands of either 
the state or employees is associated with a higher probability of being financially constrained. 
In between these groups, when ownership is concentrated in the hands of employees the effect 
is almost twice as large as when ownership is concentrated in the hands of the state. 
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Interestingly, there seems to be no significant effect of the likelihood of being financially 
constrained when ownership is concentrated in the hands of the domestic outsiders and 
foreigners, while ownership concentration in the hands of managers leads to a lower 
probability of being financially constrained.  However, a different picture sometimes emerges 
when the balanced panel is used. As before, ownership concentration in the hands of the state 
or employees is detrimental to the probability of being financially constrained. Also, foreign 
ownership concentration still shows no significant effect on the probability of being 
financially constrained. However, the effect of ownership concentration in the hands of other 
owners is different. Concentration of shares in the hands of managers is now found to increase 
the probability of the firm being financially constrained, while the reverse is true when 
ownership is concentrated in the hands of domestic outsiders. Similarly to our findings, 
Djankov and Murrell (2002) find that estimated coefficients of the effect of managerial 
ownership on firm performance are sensitive to how the selection bias is handled. Contrary to 
expectations, however, the negative effect of the concentration of ownership in the hands of 
employees is smaller than that of the concentration of ownership in the hands of managers.   
The coefficients on firm size, firm age and the dummy for soft budget constraints, are 
each found to have the expected sign, although firm age coefficient is insignificant for the 
unbalanced sample. These findings indicate that larger firms, more established firms and 
firms that have access to finance from sources other than the market are less likely to find 
themselves operating in the financially constrained regime. In a survey of the literature, 
Djankov and Murrell (2002) find a positive and significant effect of hardened budget 
constraints on enterprise restructuring, defined as sales growth, TFP or labor productivity.  In 
light of these findings, our conclusions suggest that funds obtained as soft credits are possibly 
used in unproductive and inefficient way. In an alternative specification, to test whether 
balance sheet status is more important for firms that are subject to more severe asymmetric 
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information problems, we also included in the switching regression variables for firm size and 
firm age interacted with the debt to capital ratio, the liquidity to capital ratio and the interest 
coverage to sales ratio. Since none of the interaction effects was found to be statistically 
significant, we do not report them.  
              An advantage of using the switching regression approach is that it allows easy 
calculation of the probabilities that firms operate in one or the other regime. In Tables 7.1 and 
7.2 we report probabilities over time that firms, belonging to different ownership groups, 
operate in the financially constrained regime for the unbalanced and balanced panel 
respectively. Several important findings emerge from these tables. First, the probabilities of 
being financially constrained are quite high and are stable over time. Second, consistent with 
the finding that the identity of owners matters with respect to access to finance, there are 
substantial differences in probabilities across ownership groups. Thus firms under foreign 
ownership face the lowest probability of being financially constrained. This is consistent with 
the argument that foreign owners either have access to alternative capital markets or manage 
to crowd out domestic demand for capital, given their potentially higher creditworthiness. 
Yet, a lot of foreign owned firms seem to be financially constrained. This could be driven 
from the fact that 47% of foreign owned firms are small firms as well as that a lot of them are 
direct investments of foreign entities rather than subsidiaries of or joint ventures with foreign 
companies, i.e., they lack a direct and potentially unconstrained source of financing if 
financially distressed. Under these conditions, these firms are obliged to borrow in an 
underdeveloped capital market and compete for funds with other firm types in the economy. 
Further, and consistent with the results of the switching function, insider owned firms are 
found to face higher probabilities of being financially constrained than are private outsider 
owned firms. This is especially the case for the balanced panel where both manager and 
employee owned firms face higher probabilities of being financially constrained compared 
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with foreign and domestic outsider owned firms. In order to check the statistical significance 
of these differences we perform mean difference tests, not reported here, for each pair of 
ownership groups for every year. In no case are we able to accept the null that insider and 
private outsider owned firms have equal probabilities of being financially constrained. 
Finally, state owned firms are financially constrained over the whole period under 
consideration. This result might seem surprising in light of the expectation that state owned 
firms might be subject to soft budget constraints. However, it perhaps means that, throughout 
the period, these firms were required to borrow in the capital market, where they had to face 
the competition of private firms. The strict monetary and budgetary policies of Estonian 
governments that led to direct budget subsidies of only about 1% of GDP per year provide 
support to this conjecture Third, there seems to be a weak tendency in that the probabilities 
are higher for the first and last year, indicating that probabilities of being financially 
constrained are larger during the early transition years as well as during the 1998-1999 when 
Estonia was strongly affected by the Russian crisis.       
5. Conclusions  
In this paper we analyze the investment behavior and the determinants of financial 
constraints for a panel of Estonian companies during 1993 through 1999. Our using a 
switching regression framework, when sample separation is unknown and endogenous, 
represents the first application of this approach when studying investment behavior in a 
transition economy. The major benefit of using this approach is that it eliminates the bias 
generated from misclassification when a single classification criterion is used to partition the 
sample. Furthermore, our findings provide further evidence on the performance of the 
accelerator/neoclassical model of investment behavior, as well as fresh evidence for 
hypotheses concerning the impact of a firm’s ownership structure and the degree of 
informational asymmetries and agency costs on the determination of investment. Finally, our 
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approach allows us to calculate probabilities that firms with different ownership structures 
will operate in the financially constrained regime at a particular time, and to analyze changes 
in these probabilities as transition proceeds.  
In the model, firms are assumed to be operating in either the financially constrained or 
the non-constrained regime. The regime in which a firm operates at a given time is not known 
beforehand, and is endogenously determined by a selection equation. This is modeled to be 
function of three key balance sheet variables (the debt to capital ratio, the interest coverage to 
sales ratio and the liquidity to capital ratio), as well as three variables that proxy the degree of 
asymmetric information and agency problems (the percentage of shares owned by the largest 
owner, firm age and firm size.) In addition, our approach allows us to take account of the fact 
that the effect of these variables on the probability of a firm operating in the constrained 
regime would be strongly moderated if firms would enjoy easy access to capital in the form of 
soft loans, overdue payments to suppliers, tax arrears and/or straightforward budgetary 
subsidies.   
Our findings confirm the existence of two separate investment regimes for financially 
constrained and unconstrained firms. Furthermore, to explain the investment behavior of firms 
our preferred specification is not the basic accelerator/neoclassical model of investment, but 
rather such a model that is augmented with financial variables to approximate financing 
constraints. The results confirm the hypothesis that financially constrained firms are sensitive 
to the availability of internal finance, while financially non-constrained firms are more 
responsive to future growth opportunities. The sign and magnitude of these results are often 
consistent with existing findings in the literature, both for advanced market as well as 
transition economies. Yet, our interpretation of certain coefficients is sometimes different. For 
example, we have allowed the coefficients on cash flow variables to capture future profit 
prospects besides access to finance. Under this assumption a significant coefficient of cash 
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flow for the financially unconstrained firms captures investment sensitivity to future prospects 
and the difference in coefficients between financially constrained and unconstrained firms 
captures sensitivity to access to finance. Then, we focus on the difference of cash flow 
coefficients between financially constrained and unconstrained firms as indicator of financing 
constraints. The importance of internal funds in investment decisions for financially 
constrained firms is further corroborated by the significance of variables that measure 
financial slack, included to measure only the availability of internal finance. These findings 
support the claim, of Calvo and Coricelli (1994), that investment behavior of firms in 
transition economies is consistent with a financing hierarchy theory.   
With respect to the likelihood of firms being financially constrained or not, our 
findings point to the importance of the firm’s balance sheet position, as well as to variables 
that proxy the severity of information asymmetry and agency costs. In general, our results 
indicate that firms with a weak balance sheet position and those facing more severe 
asymmetric information and agency costs problems are more likely to operate in the 
financially constrained regime. More specifically, a higher ratio of debt to capital, a bigger 
ratio of interest coverage to sales, and a lower liquidity to capital ratio increase the probability 
of a firm being financially constrained. This probability is also higher for newly privatized 
and smaller firms, as well as for those in which ownership is concentrated in the hands of 
insiders and the state. We also find that the existence of soft budget constraints lowers the 
probability of a firm being financially constrained. When actual probabilities of operating in 
the financially constrained regime are calculated, it is found that they are quite high and 
basically stable during the whole period. Overall, the analysis has shown the importance of 
different capital market imperfections in firm’s investment decisions.  
The conclusions point to the importance of ownership configurations for both 
investment behavior and the likelihood of facing financial constraints. As expected firms 
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whose ownership structures are dominated by insiders face higher probability of being 
financially constrained and display higher sensitivity to availability of internal finance. 
Moreover, ownership structure affects investment beyond its indirect effects through financial 
constraints, reflecting factors such as owners’ preferences and goals in allocating the funds. 
Allowing us to distinguish between these differential effects of ownership structures on 
investments adds further weight to the appropriateness of this approach.     
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 Table 1. Financial Institutions Indicatorsa 
Indicators 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Number of Banks Operating in 
Estonia 21 22 18 15 12 6 7 7 
Number of Foreign-Owned  
Banks 1 1 4 3 3 2 2 4 
Share of Bank Assets Owned by 
the State 25.7 28.1 9.7 6.6 0.0 7.8 7.9 0.0 
Non-performing Loans (as % of 
Total Loans) n.a. 3.5 2.4 2.0 2.1 4.0 2.9 1.5 
Credit to Private Sector (as % of 
GDP) 11.1 13.4 14.7 19.2 26.4 25.2 25.9 25.9 
Stock Market Capitalization (as % 
of GDP) n.a. n.a. n.a. 16.7 24.7 9.4 36.6 35.2 
Net Foreign Direct Investment (in 
millions of USD) 156 212 199 111 130 574 222 324 
a The source of the data is EBRD Transition Report 2001. 
. 
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Table 2. Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Investment 
 
 
 
Capital 
 
 
Employment 
 
Labor Cost 
Average Wage 
Sales 
Profit 
Cash Flow 
Debt 
Current Liabilities 
 
Total Liabilities 
 
Liquid Assets 
 
Financial Cost 
 
Asset Sale 
 
Industry Groups 
 
 
 
 
 
Size Groups 
 
 
 
Ownership Groups 
 
Ownership Categories 
 
Ownership Share 
Debt to Capital  
Interest Coverage to Sales 
Liquid Assets to Capital  
Firm Age 
Size 
Soft Budget Constraint 
 
 
Largest Share 
The sum, in real terms, of investments in reconstruction, expansion and 
acquisition of buildings, in constructions of new buildings and other business 
related projects, in buying new machinery, equipment and means of 
transportation and in buying and improving land. 
The book value, in real terms, of non-current tangible assets, calculated as 
the average of the value of these assets at the beginning and at the end of the 
year.  
The average number of employees per year. We have excluded all firms with   
fewer than 10 employees. 
The sum, in real terms, of wages and salaries in a given year. 
The ratio of labor cost to average employment in a given year. 
Net sales per year in real terms. 
Net profit per year in real terms. This is profit left after all taxes are paid. 
The sum, in real terms, of depreciation allowances and net profit. 
The sum, in real terms, of short-term loans. 
The sum, in real terms, of short-term loans and payables to suppliers and or 
customers.  
The sum, in real terms, of short and long-term loans and other short and 
long-term liabilities. 
The average per year of the sum, real terms, of cash, short-term receivables 
and short-term securities. 
The net, in real terms, of financial income accrued and financial cost incurred 
during a given year.  
Revenue, in real terms, obtained from sale of non-current tangible assets over 
a given period. 
7 broad industry groups were defined as follows: 1. Agriculture and fishing. 
2. Mining, food products, textile and leather. 3. Wood products, paper 
products, coke, petroleum, chemicals, rubber, plastic, non-metallic, basic 
metals and machinery and equipment production. 4. Electrical, optical and 
transport equipment production. 5. Energy and construction. 6. Wholesale 
and retail trade. 7. Transport.  
Firms are divided into three size groups according to their average 
employment. The first group includes firms with 49 or fewer employees, the 
second includes the firms with more than 49 employees and fewer than 101, 
and the third group includes firms with more than 101 employees. 
6 ownership groups are defined as follows: state, foreign, institutional 
domestic outsiders, former employees, incumbent employees and managers.  
Ownership categories are classified according to dominant ownership 
whereby a dominant owner holds the largest share of the voting stock. 
The share owned by the respective ownership group. 
The ratio of debt to capital. 
The ratio of interest expenses to net sales. 
The ratio of liquid assets to capital. 
The number of years the firm has been operated as a private entity. 
The logarithm of the average number of employees. 
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has negative EBITD 
and receives positive net financing defined as an increase in short-term debt 
net of financing costs. 
The percentage of shares owned by the largest owner group 
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Table 3.1 Means and Standard Deviations of Principal Variables Over 
Time for the Unbalanced Panel 
Year 
 
Variables1
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Obs.2
Investment 2150 
(12363) 
2245 
(18844) 
3371 
(22029) 
3007 
(17249) 
2634 
(15504) 
3407 
(14019) 
4547 
(19549) 
3294 
Capital 12250 
(51023) 
9740 
(48137) 
9771 
(45305) 
10329 
(47218) 
10411 
(47756) 
11200 
(49623) 
16816 
(43022) 
3294 
Sales 21773 
(63301) 
21502 
(61562) 
30377 
(93119) 
24269 
(69179) 
27573 
(77562) 
27989 
(63535) 
32816 
(88789) 
3294 
Employment3 196 
(414) 
166 
(340) 
164 
(388) 
161 
(393) 
157 
(276) 
137 
(282) 
124 
(228) 
3294 
Real Wage4 14.42 
(17.11) 
16.46 
(10.91) 
13.31 
(7.73) 
21.04 
(30.59) 
21.92 
(17.28) 
22.96 
(14.63) 
28.37 
(18.33) 
3294 
Cash Flow 805 
(7530) 
649 
(8801) 
1103 
(10008) 
658 
(12607) 
1678 
(14428) 
1994 
(18195) 
2932 
(17328) 
3294 
Debt 867 
(2692) 
891 
(4112) 
1389 
(3974) 
1701 
(4007) 
1717 
(3664) 
2276 
(3885) 
2962 
(4127) 
3294 
Current Payables 5516 
(23301) 
4848 
(21130) 
3804 
(11895) 
4334 
(12503) 
4363 
(10672) 
4605 
(12843) 
5445 
(15750) 
3294 
Long-Term 
Liabilities  
2595 
(14961) 
2702 
(19652) 
3143 
(12450) 
3433 
(12048) 
3820 
(13874) 
4469 
(12052) 
6863 
(16384) 
3294 
1All the variables except employment are expressed in thousands of Estonian kroons and in 1993 prices 
2This number is the sum over the whole sample with non-missing values for the respective variable 
3Average number of employees in a given year 
4Real average wage per employee 
 
Table 3.2 Means and Standard Deviations of Principal Variables Over 
Time for the Balanced Panel 
Year 
 
Variables1
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Obs.2
Investment 2920 
(17750) 
3881 
(28383) 
5479 
(28771) 
3984 
(24439) 
3436 
(22406) 
4539 
(22525) 
4989 
(24834) 
1491 
Capital 16335 
(60350) 
13100 
(55389) 
15064 
(54972) 
13105 
(53733) 
12523 
(45747) 
14178 
(47487) 
16806 
(48520) 
1491 
Sales 22246 
(50611) 
23386 
(50009) 
35639 
(79458) 
22801 
(51548) 
27634 
(62035) 
31008 
(72934) 
35308 
(81817) 
1491 
Employment3 197 
(394) 
174 
(365) 
161 
(334) 
149 
(306) 
144 
(297) 
138 
(279) 
125 
(256) 
1491 
Real Wage4 14.42 
(8.57) 
17.14 
(8.98) 
14.11 
(7.80) 
20.14 
(11.04) 
22.04 
(12.12) 
23.96 
(15.00) 
28.13 
(17.65) 
1491 
Cash Flow 1355 
(6895) 
1562 
(8304) 
1804 
(11728) 
1638 
(14312) 
2812 
(18763) 
3302 
(22282) 
3957 
(18062) 
1491 
Debt 1054 
(3195) 
1269 
(5837) 
1279 
(2947) 
1707 
(5449) 
1630 
(4401) 
2613 
(7497) 
3077 
(6805) 
1491 
Current Payables 5991 
(16569) 
5594 
(15302) 
5222 
(11535) 
5782 
(12822) 
6004 
(12875) 
7081 
(17126) 
8300 
(19081) 
1491 
Long-Term 
Liabilities  
4407 
(17043) 
4307 
(21776) 
4733 
(13444) 
4941 
(13580) 
5350 
(34570) 
5580 
(31480) 
5789 
(22193) 
1491 
1All the variables except employment are expressed in thousands of Estonian kroons and in 1993 prices 
2This number is the sum over the whole sample with non-missing values for the respective variable 
3Average number of employees in a given year 
4Real average wage per employee 
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Table 4.1 Share of Investment Financed Through Internal Funds Over 
Time According to Dominant Owner1   
Year 
 
Ownership Group  
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Domestic Outsider 0.94 0.85 0.95 0.88 0.94 0.94 0.99 
Employee 0.73 0.60 0.98 0.97 0.94 0.92 1.00 
Former Employee   1.00 1.00 1.00 0.91 0.92 
Foreign 0.76 0.63 0.91 0.94 0.84 0.88 0.86 
Manager 0.90 0.82 0.93 0.92 0.95 0.96 0.96 
State 0.89 0.86 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.96 1.00 
1 A firm is considered to be dominantly owned by the owner who holds the largest share. 
 
Table 4.2 Share of Investment Financed Through Loans Over Time 
According to Dominant Owner1    
Year 
 
Ownership Group  
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Domestic Outsider 0.06 0.15 0.05 0.11 0.06 0.03 0.01 
Employee 0.16 0.31 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.00 
Former Employee   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.08 
Foreign 0.06 0.22 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.08 
Manager 0.00 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 
State 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.00 
1 A firm is considered to be dominantly owned by the owner who holds the largest share
Table 5. Coefficient Estimates for Two-Component Investment Regression and Switching Equation Using 
the Unbalanced Sample and the Extended Version of the Switching Equation1
Unbalanced Panel 
Part 1 
Investment 
Equation2
Lagged Sales Twice Lagged 
Sales 
Lagged Cash 
Flow 
Twice Lagged 
Cash Flow 
Lagged Liquid 
Assets 
Twice Lagged 
Liquid Assets 
Constrained 
Regime 
0.019* 
(4.12) 
0.005* 
(17.12) 
0.013* 
(4.68) 
0.002** 
(2.51) 
0.031** 
(2.36) 
0.019*** 
(1.12) 
     Lagged Asset
Sales 
 Twice Lagged 
Asset Sales 
Domestic 
Outsider  
Foreign Manager Employee
 0.044* 0.032** 
(8.16) (2.06) 
0.001*** 
(1.59) 
0.009* 
(3.32) 
-0.003 
(0.92) 
-0.005* 
(3.95) 
N/Constrained 
Regime 
Lagged Sales Twice Lagged 
Sales 
Lagged Cash 
Flow 
Twice Lagged 
Cash Flow 
Lagged Liquid 
Assets 
Twice Lagged 
Liquid Assets 
 0.079* 0.012** 
(14.27) (8.09) 
0.007** 
(1.69) 
0.010 
(0.99) 
0.019** 
(1.94) 
0.008*** 
(1.54) 
     Lagged Asset
Sales 
 Twice Lagged 
Asset Sales 
Domestic 
Outsider  
Foreign Manager Employee
 0.021 
(0.67) 
0.012 
(0.63) 
0.004 
(0.31) 
0.007 
(1.12) 
0.0001 
(0.08) 
-0.004 
(-0.14) 
Part 2 
Switching 
Equation3
Debt-to-Capital 
Ratio 
Liquidity-to-
Capital Ratio 
Int. Coverage – to 
– Sales Ratio 
Size  Age SBC 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
0.022* 
(7.29) 
-0.002* 
(-6.47) 
0.057** 
(2.01) 
-0.026* 
(-9.12) 
-0.078 
(-0.96) 
-0.021** 
(-1.95) 
 Largest  Largest  
Share*State Share*Domestic 
Largest  
Share*Foreign 
Largest  
Share*Manager 
Largest  
Share*Employee 
 
 0.019* 
(11.47) 
0.089 
(1.08) 
0.009 
(0.57) 
-0.008* 
(-18.63) 
0.037** 
(2.23) 
 
1 * - significant at 1% confidence level, ** - significant at 5% confidence level, *** - significant at 10% confidence level. Numbers in parentheses are t-
statistics of coefficient estimates. 
2 The dependent variable is investment in fixed capital divided by lagged capital stock. The right hand side variables presented are also divided by lagged capital 
stock. Each estimated investment equation also includes a constant, time and industry dummies as well as the inverse of Mill’s ratio to account for selection bias.   
3 The dependent variable is an indicator taking value of 1 for firms classified as financially constrained and 0 for those classified as not financially 
constrained. The right hand side variables, other than time and industry dummies, enter in first lags.  
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Table 6. Coefficient Estimates for Two-Component Investment Regression and Switching Equation Using 
the Balanced Sample and the Extended Version of the Switching Equation1
Balanced Panel 
Part 1 
Investment 
Equation2
Lagged Sales Twice Lagged 
Sales 
Lagged Cash 
Flow 
Twice Lagged 
Cash Flow 
Lagged Liquid 
Assets 
Twice Lagged 
Liquid Assets 
Constrained 
Regime 
0.025** 
(2.28) 
0.008** 
(2.06) 
0.018* 
(5.18) 
0.005** 
(2.47) 
0.028* 
(7.12) 
0.014** 
(2.30) 
     Lagged Asset
Sales 
 Twice Lagged 
Asset Sales 
Domestic 
Outsider  
Foreign Manager Employee
 0.031** 
(1.94) 
0.022* 
(6.06) 
0.002** 
(2.22) 
0.010* 
(3.69) 
-0.005** 
(-2.14) 
-0.009* 
(-4.48) 
N/Constrained 
Regime 
Lagged Sales Twice Lagged 
Sales 
Lagged Cash 
Flow 
Twice Lagged 
Cash Flow 
Lagged Liquid 
Assets 
Twice Lagged 
Liquid Assets 
 0.068* 0.008*** 
(7.28) (1.19) 
0.003** 
(2.69) 
0.0012 
(0.86) 
0.018** 
(2.14) 
0.005*** 
(1.09) 
     Lagged Asset
Sales 
 Twice Lagged 
Asset Sales 
Domestic 
Outsider  
Foreign Manager Employee
 0.028 
(1.09) 
0.011 
(0.85) 
0.001 
(1.12) 
0.006 
(0.73) 
-0.001 
(-1.03) 
-0.006 
(-0.69) 
Part 2 
Switching 
Equation3
Debt-to-Capital 
Ratio 
Liquidity-to-
Capital Ratio 
Int. Coverage – to 
– Sales Ratio 
Size  Age SBC 
Coefficient 
Estimates 
0.041* 
(9.02) 
-0.01* 
(-4.98) 
0.009 
(1.12) 
-0.083* 
(-5.61) 
-0.049* 
(-6.47) 
-0.104* 
(-3.29) 
 Largest  Largest  
Share*State Share*Domestic 
Largest  
Share*Foreign 
Largest  
Share*Manager 
Largest  
Share*Employee 
 
 0.067* 
(8.51) 
0.042* 
(3.69) 
-0.002 
(-0.68) 
0.103* 
(7.19) 
0.097* 
(9.25) 
 
1 * - significant at 1% confidence level, ** - significant at 5% confidence level, *** - significant at 10% confidence level. Numbers in parentheses are t-
statistics of coefficient estimates. 
2 The dependent variable is investment in fixed capital divided by lagged capital stock. The right hand side variables presented are also divided by lagged capital 
stock. Each estimated investment equation also includes a constant, time and industry dummies.    
3 The dependent variable is an indicator taking value of 1 for firms classified as financially constrained and 0 for those classified as not financially 
constrained. The right hand side variables, other than time and industry dummies, enter in first lags.   
Table 7.1 The Average Probability of Being in the Financially Constrained 
Regime Over Time and Across Ownership Groups for the Unbalanced 
Sample 
Ownership 
Group 
Year 
State Foreign Domestic Manager Employee 
1995 0.604 0.356 0.459 0.421 0.612 
1996 0.543 0.319 0.431 0.409 0.578 
1997 0.551 0.306 0.426 0.395 0.582 
1998 0.570 0.312 0.457 0.438 0.571 
1999 0.592 0.381 0.482 0.452 0.590 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.2. The Average Probability of Being in the Financially Constrained 
Regime Over Time and Across Ownership Groups for the Balanced Sample 
Ownership 
Group 
Year 
State Foreign Domestic Manager Employee 
1995 0.569 0.318 0.428 0.413 0.574 
1996 0.521 0.296 0.416 0.401 0.549 
1997 0.529 0.289 0.404 0.386 0.557 
1998 0.558 0.305 0.441 0.416 0.532 
1999 0.571 0.366 0.467 0.429 0.567 
 
 35
B I B L I O G R A P H Y 
 
Anderson. Ronald and Chantal Kegels. 1997. "Finance and Investment In Transition: Czech 
Enterprises. 1993-1994." The William Davidson Institute Working Paper Series. No. 164. 
 
Berengaut. Julian. Augusto Lopez-Claros. Francoise Le Gall. Dennis Jones. Richard Stern. 
Ann-Margret Westin. Effie Psalida and Pietro Garibaldi. 1998. "The Baltic Countries: From 
Economic Stabilization to EU Accession." International Monetary Fund. Occasional Paper 
Series. No. 173. 
 
Berglof. Erik and Patrick Bolton. 2002. “The Great Divide and Beyond: Financial 
Architecture in Transition.” Journal of Economic Perspective Volume 16(1): 77-100. 
 
Bratkowski. Andrzej. Irena Grosfeld and Jacek Rostowski. 2000. "Investment and Finance in 
De Novo Private Firms: Empirical Results From the Czech Republic. Hungary and Poland." 
Economics of Transition. Volume 8(1): 101-116. 
 
Budina. Nina. Harry Garretsen and Eelke de Jong. 2000. "Liquidity Constraints and 
Investment in Transition: The Case of Bulgaria." Economics of Transition. Volume 8(2): 453-
475.  
 
Calvo. Guilermo A. and Fabrizio Coricelli. 1994. “Capital Market Imperfections and Output 
Response in Previously Centrally Planned Economies.” In: Building Sounds Finance in 
Emerging Market Economies. Caprio G.. D. Folkerts-Landau and T. Lane (Eds.). Washington 
DC. International Monetary Fund. 
 
 36
Chirinko. Robert S.. 1988. "Business Tax Policy. The Lucas Critique and Lessons From the 
1980s." The American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings. Volume 78 (2): 206-210. 
 
Cleary. Sean. 1999. ‘The Relationship Between Firm Investment and Financial Status.’ The 
Journal of Finance. Volume 54(2): 673-692. 
 
Djankov, Simeon and Peter Murrell. 2002. “Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A 
Quantitative Survey.” Journal of Economic Literature. Volume 40(3): 739-792. 
 
Dow. Gregory K.. 2003. Governing the Firm: Workers’ Control in Theory and Practice. 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Estonia Statistical Yearbook. 1995. Statistical Office of Estonia. Tallin. 
 
Estrin, Saul and Derek C. Jones. 1998. "The Determinants of Investment in Employee-Owned 
Firms: Evidence From France." Economic Analysis, Volume 1 (1): 17-28. 
 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Transition Reports 1994-2002. 
 
Fazzari. Steven M.. Glenn R. Hubbard and Bruce C. Petersen. 1996. ‘Financing Constraints 
and Corporate Investments: Response to Kaplan and Zingales.’ NBER Working Paper Series. 
No. 5462. 
 
Filer. Randall K. and Jan Hanousek. 2002. “Data Watch: Research Data From Transition 
Economies.” Journal of Economic Perspectives. Volume 16(1): 225-240. 
 37
 Goldfeld. Stephen M. and Richard E. Quandt. 1976. “Techniques for Estimating Switching 
Regressions.” In: Studies in Non-linear Estimation. pp: 3-35. Eds. Goldfeld. Stephen M. and 
Richard E. Quandt. Ballinger Publishing Company. Cambridge Massachusets.   
 
Hayashi. F. and T. Inoue. 1991. “The Relation Between Firm Growth and Q With Multiple 
Capital Goods: Theory and Evidence From Japanese Panel Data.” Econometrica. Volume 59 
(3): 731-753. 
 
Hite. Gailen L.. James E. Overs and Ronald C. Rogers. 1987. “The Market for Interfirm Asset 
Sales: Partial Sell-offs and Total Liquidations.” Journal of Financial Economics. Volume 18: 
229-252. 
 
Hobdari. Bersant. 2003. “Does Owner(s) Identity Matter? An Empirical Investigation of the 
Impact of Corporate Governance Structures on Capital Allocation. Investment and Financial 
Constraints.” PhD Thesis. Copenhagen Business School. No. 10.  
 
Hu. Xiaoqiang and Fabio Schiantarelli. 1998. “Investment and Capital Market Imperfections: 
A Switching Regression Approach Using U.S. Firm Panel Data.” The Review of Economics 
and Statistics. Volume 80 (3): 466-479. 
 
Jensen. Michael C.. 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow. Corporate Finance and 
Takeovers." American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings. Volume 76 (2): 323-329. 
 
 38
John. Kose and Eli Ofek. 1995. “Asset Sale and Increase in Focus.” Journal of Financial 
Economics. Volume 37: 105-126. 
 
Jorgenson. Dale W.. 1963. “Capital Theory and Investment Behavior.” American Economic 
Review Papers and Proceedings. Volume 53 (2): 247-259. Also in: Investment Volume 1: 
Capital Theory and Investment Behavior. pp. 1-16. Ed. Dale W. Jorgenson. The MIT Press. 
Cambridge Massachusetts. London. England. 
 
Jorgenson. Dale W.. 1971. “Econometric Studies of Investment Behavior: A Survey.” Journal 
of Economic Literature. Volume 9 (4): 1111-1147. 
 
Jorgenson. Dale W. and Calvin D. Siebert. 1968. “A Comparison of Alternative Theories of 
Corporate Investment Behavior.” American Economic Review. Volume 58(4): 681-712.  
 
Kalmi, Panu. 2002. On the (In)stability of Employee Ownership: Estonian Evidence and 
Lessons for Transition Economies. Ph.D. Dissertation. Copenhagen Business School, Ph.D. 
Serie 10. 
 
Kaplan. Steven N. and Luigi Zingales. 1997. “Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide 
Useful Measures of Financing Constraints.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. Volume 112 
(1): 169-215. 
 
Kim. C.. D. Mauer and A. Sherman. 1998. “The Determinants of Corporate Liquidity: Theory 
and Evidence.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. Volume 33(3): 335-360. 
 
 39
Kornai. Janos. 1980. Economics of Shortage. North Holland. Amsterdam. New York and 
Oxford. 
 
Koyck. L. M. 1954. Distributed Lags and Investment Analysis. In: Contributions to Economic 
Analysis Series. North-Holland Publishing Company. Amsterdam. 
 
Lang Larry. Annette Poulsen and Rene Stulz. 1995. “Asset Sales. Firm Performance and the 
Agency Costs of Managerial Discretion.” Journal of Financial Economics. Volume 37: 3-37. 
 
Lesink, Robert and Elmer Sterken. 1998. "Investment, Financing and Uncertainty in the Baltic 
States." Tartu University Working Paper Series, No. 26. 
 
Lizal. Lubomir and Jan Svejnar. 1998. "Enterprise Investment During the Transition: 
Evidence From Czech Panel Data." CEPR Discussion Paper Series. No. 1835. 
 
Lizal. Lubomir and Jan Svejnar. 2002. "Investment. Credit Rationing and the Soft-Budget 
Constraint: Evidence From Czech Panel Data." Review of Economics and Statistics. vol. 
84(2): pp. 353-370. 
 
Maddala. G. S.. 1986. "Disequilibrium. Self-Selection and Switching Models." In: Handbook 
of Econometrics. Volume III: pp. 1633-1688. Ed. Z. Griliches and M. D. Intriligator. Elsevier 
Science Publishers BV.  
 
 40
Maddala. G. S. and F. Nelson. 1994. “Switching Regression Models With Exogenous and 
Endogenous Switching.” In: Maddala G. S. editor: Econometric Methods and Apllications. 
Volume 2. Economists of the Twentieth Century Series. Aldershot. UK: pp. 369-372. 
 
Mygind. Niels. 2000. “Privatization. Governance and restructuring of Enterprises in the 
Baltics.” OECD Working Paper Series. No. 6. 
 
Nabi. Ijaz. 1989. "Investment in Segmented Capital Markets." The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics. Volume 104 (3): 453-462. 
 
Oliner. Stephen D.. Glenn D. Rudebusch and Daniel Sichel. 1995. "New and Old Models Of 
Business Investment: A Comparison of Forecasting Performance." Journal of Money. Credit 
and Banking. Volume 27 (3): 806-826. 
 
Oliner. Stephen D.. Glenn D. Rudebusch and Daniel Sichel. 1996. "The Lucas Critique 
Revisited: Assessing the Stability of Empirical Euler Equations for Investment." Journal of 
Econometrics. Volume 70 (1): 291-316. 
 
Schaffer. Mark E.. 1998. “Do Firms in Transition Economies Have Soft Budget Constraints? 
A Reconsideration of Concepts and Evidence.” Journal of Comparative Economics. Volume 
26(1): 80-103. 
 
Schiantarrelli. Fabio. 1996. "Financial Constraints and Investment: Methodological Issues and 
International Evidence." Oxford Review of Economic Policy. Volume 12 (2): 70-89. 
 
 41
Wedel. Michel and Wagner Kamakura. 2000. Market Segmentation: Conceptual and 
Methodological Foundations. Kluwer Academic Publishers.  
 
Zeldes. Stephen P. 1989. "Consumption and Liquidity Constraints: An Empirical 
Investigation." Journal of Political Economy. Volume 97 (2): 305-346. 
 
  
 42
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 First, the performance of investment demand models, even after being augmented with financial variables, is 
often not satisfactory in that they leave a large part of investment variation unexplained. Second, as pointed out 
by Zeldes (1989) the use of structural models, especially in short panels, might fail to detect financial constraints 
when their tightness is almost constant over time. Furthermore, there is some evidence of poor forecasting 
performance and parameter instability over time when estimating such equations as evidenced by Chirinko 
(1988), Hayashi and Inoue (1991), Oliner, Rudebusch and Sichel (1995), and Oliner, Rudebuch and Sichel 
(1996). Third, reliance on internal finance might not reflect financial constraints but rather behavior resulting 
from managers’ and/or insider owners’ preferences, such as aversion to outside control, and/or the use of an 
objective function other than maximization of dividends (dividends per capita) or even be due to Jensen’s (1986) 
"free cash flow", defined as the amount of cash at firm’s disposal above that needed to cover profitable 
investment opportunities, hypothesis. Empirically it is difficult to disentangle these effects because they involve 
unobservables and, unsurprisingly, the available evidence, reviewed in Schiantarelli (1996), is mixed.  
 
2 Although the use of multiple partition indicators is not ruled out, by interacting these indicators the sub-sample 
sizes will shrink, while the number of parameters to be estimated will increase rapidly and this might lead to 
imprecise inferences. 
 
3 Although it started functioning as a central bank only after independence, with the local branch of a Soviet 
bank carrying out the central bank duties up to that time. 
 
4 The increased state’s share for 1998 is due to the re-nationalization of a bank that became insolvent during 
1998. In 2000 this bank was sold to a Finnish financial group bringing the state’s share in the banking sector 
back to zero. 
 
5 The data cover credit extended to households as well as to enterprises. 
 
6 The small nature of the market becomes clear by one example: flotation of Estonian Telecom in February 1999 
increased market capitalization by 50%. 
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7 This includes both the Tallin Stock Exchange and Over The Counter market. 
 
8 Another source of external funds is foreign direct investment (FDI). In the long run, it is expected that firms 
that receive FDI will become less financially constrained than those that do not receive FDI. Given its very 
favorable investment climate, Estonia has been very successful in attracting large inflows of FDI, as documented 
by the last row of Table 1. The sharp increase in FDI in 1998 is caused by acquisitions of two large Estonian 
banks by Swedish investors. 
 
9 The criteria are: (i) The firm’s capital at the beginning and the end of the period should be positive; (ii) 
Investment should be non-negative; (iii) Investment should be smaller than end of period capital stock; (iv) Sales 
should be positive; (v) The average employment per year should be positive and equal or greater than 10 ; (vi) 
Labor cost in a given year should be positive ; (vii) Ownership shares should add up to 100. 
 
10 A detailed account of the implications of applying the criteria and for the construction of the sample can be 
found in Hobdari (2003). 
 
11 A detailed description of the sample composition by ownership and size can be found in Hobdari (2003). 
 
12 It would be interesting to compare this ownership distribution with the economy-wide one prevailing in 
Estonia in 1995. Unfortunately, this is not possible because official data from statistical yearbooks do not 
provide detailed classification of ownership shares held by different owners as defined above. Furthermore, 
although the official data distinguish between state, foreign and private firms, it is not clear which definition is 
used to classify firms in a given group. For example, Estonia Statistical Yearbook (1995) states that, by the 
second half of 1995, 87% of enterprises in Estonia were private. It is highly likely that even enterprises with a 
small involvement of private capital are classified as private ones, leading to potential overstatement of the true 
degree of private ownership. 
 
13 In our empirical work in order to check the robustness of results, as well as for possible consequences of entry 
and exit of firms over time, we report estimates using both the balanced and unbalanced panels. 
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14 Financial statements contain some information on sources of financing investment in fixed capital. This 
information, however, is missing for most of the firms in our sample. With the non-missing information a sub-
sample of 862 firm observations over time is constructed. The summary statistics of the relevant variables for 
these observations are similar to those from the unbalanced and balanced panel. 
 
15 The data for loans include both short-term and long-term loans. 
 
16 In several cases the sum of respective shares from both tables belonging to a given ownership group does not 
sum up to 1. This means that other sources, except for internal funds and loans, have been used to finance 
investment. These sources are classified as private sources and might consist either of owner’s own financing 
that does not go to increase owner’s share in the company or of financing coming from other non-financial 
institutions.  
 
17 As shown in Table 1, the share of credit extended to the private sector to GDP, although increasing over time, 
has been low. This phenomenon, associated with high demand for funds at the beginning of transition, leads us 
to conjecture that fierce competition in the credit market has resulted in credit rationing for a subset of firms.  
 
18 Only the data used by Lizal and Svejnar (1998, 2002) cover a long enough time span that allows the authors to 
capture appropriate dynamics. 
 
19 A good summary of switching regression models, their applications and problems in their estimation can be 
found in Maddala (1986) and Maddala and Nelson (1994). 
 
20 Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) estimate a similar model with unknown sample separation for a sample of U.S. 
manufacturing firms. On the other hand, Nabi (1989) estimates an endogenous switching regression model with 
known sample separation for a sample of Pakistani firms using information on firm's access to formal or 
informal credit markets to separate the sample. Other approaches that employ the switching regression model 
strategy are studies of the effect of liquidity constraints on consumption and studies of wage determination in 
labor markets. Finally, a similar approach is adopted by Cleary (1999), who employs a two-step procedure. In 
the first step he uses discriminant analysis to partition the sample into financially constrained, partially 
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financially constrained and not financially constrained firms. In the second step, he estimates investment 
equations separately for each sub-sample. The index constructed to partition the sample is assumed to be a 
function of firm liquidity, leverage, profitability and growth. 
 
21 In this analysis the results are obtained using the EM algorithm available in STATA 8. It should be stressed 
that standard error estimates are only approximate and, in general, might be biased downwards. During 
estimation the iterative method to obtain bootstrapped standard errors is used. Further, because the likelihood 
function is not globally concave, the choice is between several local maxima. The selected maximum is the one 
that maximizes the likelihood function obtained from different starting values of the classification criteria. More 
detailed discussion of these issues is provided in Wedel and Kamakura (2000), pages 84-91. 
 
22 Studies that employ the neoclassical/accelerator model of investment demand include Jorgenson and Siebert 
(1968), Jorgenson (1971), Anderson and Kegels (1997), Lizal and Svejnar (1998, 2002), Budina et al. (2000) and 
Bratkowski et al. (2000).  
 
23 An example would be a banking crisis or economy wide productivity shocks, which affect similarly all firms 
in the economy. 
 
24 The original notion of soft budget constraints, as introduced by Kornai (1980), regarded the state as 
paternalistic. The state was unwilling to accept the social consequences of closing down loss-making firms and, 
instead, would intervene and bail them out unconditionally. 
 
25 Tax arrears are those taxes that should have been paid but are not. Examples of such taxes are corporate and 
social security taxes. 
 
26 This is probably also the case for Estonia because it enforced a tough bankruptcy already from the early stage 
of transition (Mygind, 2000). 
 
27 This measure has two further pitfalls. First, it might fail to capture firms with genuine soft budget constraint, 
which is defined as the situation under which firm’s behavior is conditional to its own expectation and financing 
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institution commitment that some financing will be provided in the future. Second, it might classify as firms that 
experience soft budget constraints those firms that in fact do not. For example, young or newly established firms 
might be loss-making during the first years of their existence until they gain market share and establish relations 
with financial institutions. In the meantime, they might be receiving outside financing in response to their long-
term growth potential. Both these problems generate biases in the real number of firms that experience soft 
budget constraints, with the former understating the real number of firms that experience soft budget constraints, 
while the latter overstating it. The true direction and degree of the bias however is unknown beforehand. 
However, the fact that most of the firms that are classified here as experiencing soft budget constraints are large 
and established firms and not young small firms with low earnings but with possible high future earning 
potential indicates that the second source of bias is not important in this case. 
 
28 We estimated different versions of investment equations by experimenting with the number of lags of all 
variables included in the specifications. Standard model selection criteria, such as individual coefficients’ 
significance, the adjusted R2, Akaike Information Criteria and Schwartz Information Criteria, are then used to 
discriminate among models. The results presented here are for the best performing model. In this model, the 
investment equation includes lagged sales, twice lagged sales, lagged cash flow, twice lagged cash flow, lagged 
liquid assets, twice lagged liquid assets, lagged asset sales, and twice lagged asset sales, all normalized with 
lagged capital stock, along with ownership, time and industry dummies as explanatory variables. 
 
29 In unreported regressions we estimated the model using a restricted version of the switching function, which 
included only financial variables. The findings based on these estimates are essentially unaltered from those 
reported in Tables 5 and 6. These unreported regressions are available from the authors upon request.  
 
30 As noted, the sample separation into potentially constrained and non-constrained firms is endogenous and not 
known beforehand. Yet, in order to carry out the estimation an initial guess is needed to partition the sample. For 
details of the procedure used to estimate the starting values that are used to undertake the maximum likelihood 
estimation see Hobdari (2003). 
 
31 These results were obtained for the pooled sample. When estimation is carried out on data from individual 
categories of firms the range of estimates the authors obtain is quite large. For example, in Lizal and Svejnar 
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2χ
(1998) the sum of coefficients on output ranges from 0.002 to 0.597, while the sum of coefficients on profit 
ranges from –1.241 to 0.025. In Lizal and Svejnar (2002) the same coefficients ranges from –0.003 to 0.572 for 
output and from –0.808 to 0.063 for profit.  
 
32 Kalmi (2002) in a field survey of firms under insider ownership in Estonia reports that in only 6% of his 
sample there are no restrictions on share trading. Furthermore, in 92% of the cases insiders are asked to offer 
their shares first to current shareholders. This suggests that the possibility to get a capital gain on individual 
shares is quite limited like it is the case for collective ownership. 
 
33 The critical values of distribution at 5% significance level with 46 and 45 degrees of freedom are 62.29 
and 61.66 respectively. The respective values of likelihood ratio tests are 209.12 for the unbalanced panel and 
147.38 for the balanced panel.  
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